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abstract:
Multinational Corporation (MNCs) should gain advantage from international diver-
sification by lowering their systemic risk and reducing their bankruptcy cost. Hence,
internationalization should induce larger leverage. However, it may imply additional
agency costs due to wider informal gaps and higher cost of investigation induced by the
multiplication of markets. To examine how currency diversification of asset may change
the bank’s systemic risk, we provide a theoretical framework based on relative CAPM
by introducing explicitly the exchange rate risk. Due to exchange rate dynamics asset
diversification may reduce systemic risk even through the two assets are perfectly corre-
lated.
Using innovative micro data on credit institutions located in France between 1999 and
2014 we expand our analysis to the net effect of US dollar diversification of assets.
Contrary to past studies, this measure of financial internationalization take into consid-
eration the exchange rate risk. Although our results highlight the two opposite effects
of diversification, they posit the importance of international agency costs in the capital
structure decision.
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1 Introduction
The last financial crisis has highlighted the international implication of European global
banks in the US financial markets. Following Borio and Disyatat [2011], Baba et al.
[2009], McGuire and Von Peter [2012], European banks were largely involved in US
money markets by using their local subsidiaries as sources of funding. Considering this
international development, European banks are supposed to have a currency diversifica-
tion of both their assets and their liabilities. Focusing on credit institutions located in
France, we observe a large increase of euro denomination between 1999 and 2008 mainly
due to the euro area enlargement. However, currency diversification measuring by the
share of assets or liabilities in foreign currency includes a significant part of the banks’
balance sheet between 1999 and 2014 with an average of 0.23 over the period.
In addition to the well known determinants of the capital structure,2 internation-
alization induces an enlarge framework of activities which might change the capital
structure decision. As posited by Burgman [1996], Shapiro [2013], the Multinational
Corporation (MNCs) should gain advantage from a diversification by lowering their
risks. MNCs should observe lower volatility of earnings and hence lower probability
of bankruptcy. Following the trade-off theory from Kraus and Litzenberger [1973], the
decline in bankruptcy cost would induce larger leverage. However, internationalization
also implies additional agency costs such as wider informal gaps and higher cost of in-
vestigation due to the multiplication of markets.
Although Fatami [1984], Shaked [1986] find that MNCs have a lower systemic risk
than Domestic Corporations (DCs), a significant part of the empirical literature [Burgman
[1996], Reeb et al. [1998], Kwok and Reeb [2000]] concludes to a negative relationship
2Frank and Goyal [2008] provide a review of the literature of good quality including trade-off and
pecking theories
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between MNCs’ internationalization and MNCs’ leverage. These conclusions suggest the
domination of agency costs in the net effect of internationalization.
Past empirical studies including Burgman [1996], Chen et al. [1997], Griffin and
Karolyi [1998], Singh and Nejadmalayeri [2004], Akhtar [2005] proxy international di-
versification dimension by focusing on the foreign sales ratio. Supposing that having
external activities does not necessarily imply different currencies, these analyses do not
take into account the potential exchange rate channel. Including currency diversification
would take into consideration this dimension.
Thus, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of total asset’s US dollar
diversification on capital structure. We use innovative micro data on credit institutions
located in French between 1999 and 2014. Accessing to this kind of data gives us all
information on the currency breakdown of each bank’s balance sheet.
This paper implies two main contributions. First, it provides a theoretical framework
which completes works from Reeb et al. [1998], Kwok and Reeb [2000] by introducing
the exchange rate risk in the definition of the systemic risk. As our interest is on the
global capital decision of banks, our focus is on consolidated leverage. It implies a con-
version of foreign asset in domestic currency. By introducing the conversion of asset in
foreign currency, the definition of systemic risk through the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM) specifies the effect of exchange rate in systemic risks. Second, it fills the gap
in the current empirical literature which does not include currency diversification in the
determinants of the leverage. To our knowledge this paper is the first attempt to link
empirically currency diversification with capital structure decision at a micro level.
Our results suggest a negative relationship between US dollar diversification of as-
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sets and leverage especially for investment banks. By focusing on diversification relative
resident counterpart, our results highlight the importance of agency costs and the two
opposite effects of currency diversification. Interestingly, the crisis may increase the net
effect of diversification. Finally, the introduction of banks fixed effects confirm conclu-
sions from Lemmon et al. [2008] even though diversification stay negative and significant.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops theoretical
framework based on the CAPM. Section 3 describes the data set and provides details
on the sample selection. Section 4 explain our empirical approach. Finally, empirical
results are given in section 5.
2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Definition of Assets and Exchange rate:
Note C the domestic asset. Returns of domestic assets are expressed through Stochastic
Differential Equation (SDE) such as:
dC
C
= rCdt+ σCdZC (1)
E (dC/C)
dt
= rC
Var (dC/C)
dt
= σ2C (2)
Where dZC ∼ (0, dt).
Note C? the foreign asset in foreign currency and S the exchange rate such that C?S
is the total foreign asset in domestic currency. Using SDE, we can define the following
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components such as:
dC?
C?
= rC?dt+ σC?dZC? (3)
E (dC?/C?)
dt
= rC?
Var (dC?/C?)
dt
= σ2C? (4)
dS
S
= µdt+ σSdZS (5)
E (dS/S)
dt
= µ
Var (dS/S)
dt
= σ2S (6)
dC?S
C?S
= (rC? + µ)dt+ σC?dZC? + σSdZS (7)
E (dC?S/C?S)
dt
= rC? + µ
Var (dC?S/C?S)
dt
= σ2C? + σ
2
S + 2CovS,C? (8)
Where dZC? ∼ (0, dt) and dZS ∼ (0, dt).
2.2 CAPM:
Following Shapiro [2013], a more diversified institution would have less correlated returns
with the market and its systemic risk may decrease. To examine how asset diversification
may change the systemic risk of the bank, we develop the relative Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) to the domestic asset. It consists of a risk-free interest rate rf,t plus a
risk premium function of a systemic risk βC,C? and a market risk (rC,t − rf,t) such as:
ri,t = rf,t + βC,C?S(rC,t − rf,t) (9)
Where:
ri,t = equilibrium expected return for the foreign project i relative to the domestic
rf,t = rate of return on a risk-free asset
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βC,C?S = the foreign asset beta when measured relative to the domestic asset
rC = the expected return on the domestic asset
βC,C?S is the systemic risk of the foreign asset relative to the domestic asset. It is a
function of standard deviations and of the correlation between the two assets ρ(C,C?S)
such as:
βC,C?S
dt
=
ρ(C,C?S) . σC?S
σC
(10)
In order to introduce the exchange rate risk in our analysis, we compare the domestic
asset with the foreign asset converted in domestic currency. If βC?S is less than one,
then the foreign project which consist of investing in foreign asset in foreign currency
implies lower risk. Following the literature on capital structure and internationalization,
it should imply higher leverage.
The correlation between the two assets ρ(C,C?S) can be developed such as:
ρ(C,C?S)
dt
=
CovC,C?S
σC σC?S
(11)
=
E
(
dC
C
dC?S
C?S
)− E (dCC )E (dC?SC?S )
σC σC?S
(12)
=
CovCC? + CovCS
σC σC?S
(13)
=
ρCC? σC? + ρCS σS
σC?S
(14)
Where ρCC? and ρCS are respectively the correlation between the two assets and the
correlation between the domestic asset and the exchange rate. Thus, the beta of the
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foreign asset relative to the domestic one becomes:
βC,C?S
dt
= ρCC?
σC?
σC
+ ρCS (15)
If σC = σC? and if ρCC? = 1, then a negative correlation between the domestic asset
and the exchange rate ρCS implies a beta lower than 1. Under these conditions, asset
diversification is beneficial. If σC = σC? but 0 < ρCC? < 1, then the correlation between
the domestic asset and the exchange rate can be positive but it should be lower than
1− ρCC? to be beneficial.
If σC < σC? and if ρCC? = 1, diversification is not beneficial. However, a neg-
ative correlation between the domestic asset and the exchange rate ρCS would miti-
gate the increasing volatility. If ρCC? < 1, the diversification can still be beneficial if
ρCS < 1− ρCC? σC?σC .
No surprisingly, if σC > σC? then diversification is beneficial even with a positive
correlation ρCS such that ρCS < 1− σC?σC .
As diversified banks should face lower risks, these banks would face lower expected
bankruptcy costs. Therefore they have a higher capacity to carry debt in Modigliani
and Merton [1963] a world.
However, diversification may also induce agency costs such as the covering of foreign
financial markets and exchange rate or facing additional information asymmetry. Hence
in a future version of this paper we may want to develop a trade-off model to supplement
our analysis .
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3 Data set and sample selection
Our sample consists of french and foreign credit institutions located in France. Data are
collected by the french banking supervision authority known as the ACPR. Data are on
a yearly basis from 1999 to 2014 included. Because of bankruptcies, sample selection
and merger acquisitions, our panel is unbalanced.
We implement two sample selections to built sub-samples. First, we keep credit in-
stitutions which have a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period. It brings more
stability on our sample. Second, we identify investment banks by following the method-
ology of Baglioni et al. [2013] except that we focus on the type of liabilities the bank uses.
Contrary to the United States, banks in France can make both operations under the same
entity. There is no distinction between commercial and investment banks. However, the
nature of banking activities may change capital structure decision as posited by Gropp
and Heider [2010], Kalemli-Ozcan et al. [2011]. In this paper, a credit institution is thus
identified as an investment bank if its average ratio of deposit to total debt is lower than
the median value of the total sample over the period.
The final data set brings together two types of data. First, we focus on classical
accounting data such as total asset, collateral, equity and net income. Those data can
be collected at a different level of consolidation depending on the credit institution.
For large and international institutions, data are consolidated using the IFRS account-
ing standards. Smaller parent institutions provide consolidated data and use french
accounting standards (FRGAAP). Finally, stand-alone institutions provide unconsoli-
dated data. With years, consolidated data becomes more and more dominant. In 2014,
all the data are consolidated. As the three different levels of consolidation may imply
different rules and definitions of the balance sheet components, we control for it in our
7
analysis.
The second type of data includes foreign currency exposures which breakdown cred-
its and debt securities. These exposures are unconsolidated. As our interest is on the
global analysis of banking groups, we need to build a proxy of consolidated diversifica-
tion. The solution we choose consists in adding up currency exposures of all affiliates in
the same banking group. Thereby, currency diversification of a banking group is mea-
sured through a ratio of total amount denominated in a given currency relative to the
total amount in all currencies.
This measure may have two issues. First, there is a risk of a double counting because
of intra-group flows. However, as long as diversification is a ratio, the double counting
issue appears in both the numerator and the denominator. It mitigates the risk. Second,
unconsolidated data do not include exposures of affiliates abroad. Thus, this measure
of currency diversification might underestimate the true degree of diversification of a
banking group.
An alternative of this measure of currency diversification consists in keeping the
exposures of the head of the group only. However, this alternative shows really thin
differences with our measure, except for cooperative banking groups. As cooperative
banking groups are more decentralized, we believe that our measure better captures the
overall currency diversification of these groups.
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4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Model:
We follow Gropp and Heider [2010] approach where all variables are in level and the
explanatory variables are lagged. Two main theories feed this approach, the trade-off
theory from Kraus and Litzenberger [1973] and the pecking order theory from Myers
and Majluf [1984]. All together, they identify four main determinants of the leverage.
The trad-off theory suggests that Size affects positively the leverage. Larger insti-
tutions benefit from an implicit protection against bankruptcy because of their too big
to fail position. There is less risk for creditors and the cost of raising debt decreases.
Banks have thereby an incentive to increase their leverage.
Regarding profitability captured by the variable Profit, the trade-off theory predicts
that higher profitability decreases the cost of raising debt because of the good signal sent
to creditors. Thus, the relationship should be positive. On the contrary, the pecking-
order theory suggests a negative relationship. Institutions with large profits would prefer
to use this resource instead of new to debt or additional equity. In fact issuing new debt
or increasing equity is quite costly for the bank.
According to the trade-off theory, the collateral measured by the variable Collateral
gives a guarantee for the creditors of the institution. Considering that more collateral
reduces the cost of debt, banks should have higher leverage.
Following the literature on multinational companies and internationalization3, inter-
nationalization induces two potential and opposite effects. In one hand, it allows MNCs
3Burgman [1996], Chen et al. [1997], Griffin and Karolyi [1998], Akhtar [2005]
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to diversify their risks and the bankruptcy costs. On the other hand it implies additional
agency costs which might offset internationalization benefits.
Assuming that US dollar diversification also concerns bank’s collateral, collateral
should be diversified regarding risks and it should offer a better guarantee for credi-
tors. US dollar diversification may thereby increase the role played by collateral in the
determination of leverage. In the other hand, US dollar diversification induces extra
monitoring costs. These two effects are captured by the interaction term between the
collateral ratio and US dollar diversification with the coefficient β5. As it includes op-
posite effects, the expected sign of β5 capture the net effect of currency diversification.
We introduce Divers with β4 as a control variable.
The final specification is of the form:
Leveragei,t = α+ β1 Sizei,t−1 + β2 Profiti,t−1 + β3 Collaterali,t−1 + β4 Diversi,t−1
+ β5 (Collaterali,t−1 x Diversi,t−1) + δ Controls+ γFEtime + ui,t
(CAP)
We introduced three control variables in Controls in addition to Diver. First, we
define a ratio of total off-balance to total asset Off BS. This variable would control
for hedging strategy. Second, we use a dummy Conso which is equal to 1 if the data are
consolidated. Finally, we introduce another dummy IFRS which is equal to 1 if credit
institutions are under the IFRS accounting standards. These two dummies control for
the different sources we have explained in section 3.
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4.2 Empirical findings:
4.2.1 Exchange rate and domestic asset:
Our theoretical framework posits that under the assumption of a negative correlation
between the domestic asset and the exchange rate (defined as the number of domestic
units per unit of foreign currency), currency diversification should reduce systemic risk.
Figure 1 graph the euro dollar exchange rate with the CAC 40 index. In this graph, an
increase in the euro dollar exchange rate translates an appreciation of the euro.4 Between
Figure 1: Domestic asset and exchange rate
2003 and September 2014 the correlation between the CAC 40 and the exchange rate
was equal to 0.3 and it was significant at 1%. There is a positive correlation between
the potential domestic asset and the value of the domestic currency. This descriptive
statistic supports our theoretical conclusions where an improvement of the domestic
asset is associated with an appreciation of the domestic currency. The next sections
develop the empirical findings regarding the capital structure decision.
4In our theoretical framework S is defined as the number of domestic units per unit of foreign currency.
An decrease of S translates an appreciation of the domestic currency.
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4.2.2 A global vision from 1999 to 2014:
Regarding the three main determinants identified by the literature - known as size, prof-
itability and collateral - our results in table 3 confirm both theories depending on the
variable. Size is positive and significant for all specifications thereby confirming the
trade-off theory. The largest institutions benefit from an implicit protection which re-
duces their cost of raising debt. Thus, larger institutions tend to have higher leverage.
The profitability is negative and significant for almost all samples. These results confirm
the pecking order theory where banks prefer to use their profit instead of raising new
debt. The collateral ratio is positive and significant for all samples thereby supporting
the trade-off theory. Considering that collateral offers a protection for the creditors,
banks benefit from lower cost of debt which leads to higher leverage. Moreover, coef-
ficients increase when we focus on all investment banks and investment banks with at
least five years occurrence.
Our main variable of interest - the interaction term between the collateral ratio and
the US dollar diversification - should tell us whether US dollar diversification reduces
the role played by collateral in the determination of leverage. The coefficient of this
interaction term is negative for all specifications and significant for the two samples fo-
cusing on investment banks. It suggests that benefits from credit risk diversification is
dominated by additional agency cost.
Going further, table 4 reports regressions when the US dollar diversification of asset
only concerns domestic counterparty. Divers RES isolates the agency costs of diversifi-
cation by excluding main advantages from asset diversification. With large and mainly
significant coefficients on the interaction term, our results suggest that US dollar diver-
sification of asset relative to domestic counterparty reduces the role played by collateral
in the determination of leverage. Comparing with previous results in table 3, it supports
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the idea that US dollar diversification includes two opposite effects which are relevant
for the capital structure.
Finally, we introduce the mismatch position dummy in table 5. It does not change
our previous conclusion and the coefficient of the mismatch position are not significant.
4.2.3 A two periods decomposition:
Capital structure decision theory is linked to the creditors’ perception of banks stability
and performance. The subprime crisis followed by the euro area debt crisis may have
affected it for different reasons. First, the implicit guarantee of the ”Too big to fail”
has been questioned with large banks bankruptcy. Second, risk was undervalued before
the crisis which plays an important role in the risk premium and the cost of debt. An
adjustment has been observed since then. It might increase the role of profit as a source
of funding. Third, the notion of collateral and the way banks raise funds has changed in
the euro area since the beginning of the crisis. On one hand, the safety of government
bonds has been questioned with the euro area debt crisis. On the other hand, the ECB
has enlarged the definition of eligible collateral and proposed new facilities which changes
the usual sources of funding. Finally, the cost of US dollar debt has largely increased
especially in 2011. Theferore two sub-periods decomposition allows us to see whether
the relationship is symmetric or not.
For all these reasons, table 6 decomposes the complete period of 1999-2014 into two
sub-periods from 1999 to 2007 and from 2008 to 2014 for the pre-crisis and the post-crisis
period respectively. There is no complete reversal of the situation for the usual variables
used in the capital structure decision.
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Regarding our main variable of interest, our results suggest that the post-crisis period
is more relevant to capture the role played by US dollar diversification. Compared to
the global period or the pre-crisis sub-period, coefficients relative to the interaction term
are larger. Uncertainty and euro-dollar exchange rate volatility have increased in the
post-crisis period thereby extending agency costs.
4.2.4 Introducing banks Fixed-Effects:
As we might want to identify leverage determinants within banks, we introduce in table
7 banks Fixed-Effects. Profitability and the collateral ratio are not significant anymore
which suggests that heterogeneity comes from cross section for those variables. As high-
lighted by Lemmon et al. [2008], capital structures is mainly determined by stable factors
that do not change over time. Our descriptive statistics in previous section illustrate it.
Our main variable of interest - the interaction term between collateral and US dollar
diversification - is not significant anymore while the the diversification taking apart is
negative and significant for all samples.
5 Conclusion
International diversification should imply a decline in systemic risk which decreases the
cost of bankruptcy. Therefore, banks with larger currency diversification of assets should
have higher leverage. However, financial internationalization my also imply additional
agency costs including wider informal gaps and higher cost of investigation due to the
multiplication of markets.
Following the CAPM specification, diversification should reduce systemic risk if as-
sets are not perfectly correlated. Through an adaptation of the CAPM, we show that due
14
to exchange rate dynamics asset diversification may reduce systemic risk even through
the two assets are perfectly correlated. However, our current model does not include
potential agency costs.
Our empirical results support past studies which posit a negative relationship be-
tween internationalization and leverage. Focusing on resident counterpart of assets, our
analysis highlights the importance of international agency costs in the capital struc-
ture decision. Moreover, it shows the presence of a total net effect which combine the
advantage of diversification and the additional cost.
15
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6 Appendix
.1 Variable definitions
Table 1: Variable definitions
Main variables:
Leverage AssetEquity
Size ln(Asset)
Profit. Net incomeAsset
Collateral CollateralAsset
Divers Asset denominated in USDTotalAsset
Divers RES Asset denominated in USD with resident conterpartyTotalAsset
Invest. =1 if
(
Deposit
Total Debt
)
i
<
(
Deposit
Total Debt
)
median(i...N)
Mismatch =1 if Asset in foreign currency > Liability in foreign currency
Controls:
FR =1 if banks are french
Dep. Ratio =”low” if the bank’s deposit ratio deposit/debt is in the left hand
side of the distribution (the first 25%) ; =”medium low” if
its ratio is in between the 25% and the 50% ; =”medium high” if its
ratio is in between the 50% and the 75% ; and =”high” if its ratio
is in the last 25% of the right side of the distribution.
Sub Cat. Breakdown credit institutions between banks, cooperative banking groups
and other
Conso =1 if data are consolidated
IFRS =1 if banks report data using IFRS standards
Off BS Off−balance sheetAsset
18
.2 Correlation
19
Table 2: Variance co-variance matrix (1999-2014)
Leverage Size Profit Collateral Diver. Diver RES Invest. Mismatch
Leverage 1
529
Size 0.4931* 1
0
529 529
Profit -0.3287* -0.1815* 1
0 0
529 529 529
Collateral 0.1891* 0.1693* 0.1261* 1
0 0.0001 0.0037
529 529 529 529
Divers -0.0982* -0.3498* -0.1066* -0.2289* 1
0.0239 0 0.0142 0
529 529 529 529 529
Divers RES -0.0951* -0.2868* -0.0019 -0.1683* 0.6160* 1
0.0288 0 0.9646 0.0001 0
529 529 529 529 529 529
Invest. -0.1247* -0.2790* 0.043 -0.2245* 0.2840* 0.2394* 1
0.0041 0 0.3234 0 0 0
529 529 529 529 529 529 529
Mismatch -0.1864* -0.1974* 0.0811 -0.1130* 0.0728 0.0317 -0.0322 1
0 0 0.0623 0.0093 0.0942 0.4673 0.4601
529 529 529 529 529 529 529 529
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.3 Empirical results
Table 3: Leverage determinant and US dollar diversification
Dependent variable :
Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
Sizet−1 3.15*** 3.31*** 3.66*** 3.47***
(0.40) (0.42) (0.79) (0.84)
Profitt−1 -86.72** -72.93* -89.84 -185.86*
(35.35) (39.86) (68.90) (95.24)
Collateralt−1 15.07* 16.96* 27.06*** 29.02***
(8.37) (8.59) (8.84) (8.77)
Diverst−1 1.02 1.18 -4.88 -3.83
(3.70) (4.03) (8.01) (9.28)
Collateral x Diverst−1 -45.59 -52.93 -77.82* -90.23**
(42.64) (44.96) (39.10) (35.86)
Consot−1 -0.93 -1.69 -2.01 -2.01
(2.70) (2.85) (6.13) (6.44)
Off BSt−1 0.30 0.86 2.33 2.56*
(1.62) (1.67) (1.49) (1.47)
IFRSt−1 1.82 1.44 -0.73 0.76
(2.69) (2.90) (3.37) (3.54)
Constant -11.37*** -11.74** -16.69*** -16.61***
(3.96) (4.76) (3.69) (3.29)
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.55 0.62 0.65
N 412 367 210 191
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. LSDV include sub-category of banks, Dep.
Ratio and banks’ nationality. Time Fixed-Effects included.
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Table 4: Leverage determinant, US dollar diversification and pure valuation effect
Dependent variable :
Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
Sizet−1 2.22*** 2.18*** 3.38*** 3.16***
(0.39) (0.41) (0.74) (0.76)
Profitt−1 -124.48** -123.26** -74.84 -143.29
(47.08) (54.27) (62.29) (88.60)
Collateralt−1 16.35* 17.55* * 25.11** 26.61**
(8.77) (9.21) (9.86) (10.29)
Divers RESt−1 6.89 6.41 7.37 21.16
(5.58) (5.81) (28.20) (29.64)
CollateralxDivers RESt−1 -123.33* -123.33 -251.83** -302.56**
(73.45) (76.70) (123.24) (136.96)
Consot−1 -0.62 -0.02 0.84 1.24
(2.69) (2.85) (5.84) (5.96)
Off BSt−1 -1.05 -0.66 2.64 2.81
(1.63) (1.76) (1.84) (1.95)
IFRSt−1 -0.68 -0.88 0.82 2.59
(2.99) (3.16) (3.47) (3.57)
Constant -8.09** -7.96* -17.95*** -18.22***
(3.45) (4.36) (4.35) (4.37)
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.41 0.60 0.61
N 412 367 210 191
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. LSDV include sub-category of banks, Dep.
Ratio and banks’ nationality. US dollar diversification focuses on US dollar
diversification with resident counterparty only. Time Fixed-Effects included.
22
Table 5: Leverage determinant, US dollar diversification and mismatch position
Dependent variable :
Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
Sizet−1 3.14*** 3.38*** 3.53*** 3.38***
(0.38) (0.38) (0.73) (0.78)
Profitt−1 -86.55** -72.19* -90.89 -188.18*
(35.64) (38.65) (70.60) (98.56)
Collateralt−1 14.97* 17.49** 26.35*** 28.58***
(8.17) (8.26) (8.62) (8.49)
Diverst−1 1.00 1.50 -4.82 -3.92
(3.68) (3.95) (7.99) (9.37)
Collateral x Diverst−1 -45.27 -54.73 -75.31** -88.60**
(41.72) (43.39) (37.05) (33.46)
Mismatcht−1 -0.24 0.91 -1.26 -0.74
(1.33) (1.40) (1.42) (1.46)
Consot−1 -0.95 -1.60 -1.85 -1.91
(2.75) (2.90) (6.13) (6.40)
Off BSt−1 0.30 0.83 2.25 2.50*
(1.62) (1.71) (1.47) (1.44)
IFRSt−1 1.84 1.34 -0.50 0.89
(2.69) (2.85) (3.30) (3.51)
Constant -11.15*** -12.74*** -17.03*** -13.74***
(4.01) (4.69) (3.35) (3.88)
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.55 0.62 0.64
N 412 367 210 191
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. LSDV include sub-category of banks, Dep.
Ratio and banks’ nationality. Time Fixed-Effects included.
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Table 6: Leverage determinant, US dollar diversification and crisis decomposition
Dependent variable : Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
Sizet−1 3.15*** 3.43*** 3.43*** 3.21***
(0.39) (0.43) (0.84) (0.95)
Post-crisis x Sizet−1 2.96*** 3.09*** 4.11*** 4.04***
(0.67) (0.70) (0.79) (0.76)
Profitt−1 -82.28** -67.33* -74.83 -208.55
(35.24) (36.67) (72.74) (123.63)
Post-crisis x Profitt−1 -100.19* -90.46 -265.33 -236.47
(50.39) (60.62) (190.16) (193.93)
Collateralt−1 21.30** 24.28** 30.39*** 34.19***
(9.27) (9.57) (9.89) (9.64)
Post-crisis x Collateralt−1 1.60 1.59 23.63*** 22.99***
(9.86) (10.79) (8.10) (8.08)
Diverst−1 1.12 3.73 -5.93 -0.28
(3.85) (3.97) (11.00) (15.92)
Post-crisis x Diverst−1 0.34 -7.39 1.67 2.54
(8.40) (8.21) (11.23) (11.77)
Collateral x Diverst−1 -58.78 -69.09 -70.60 -93.45**
(41.30) (43.14) (42.21) (41.18)
Post-crisis(Collateral x Diverst−1) -21.77 -13.84 -183.74** -178.80**
(77.37) (82.05) (67.99) (69.46)
Post-crisis dummy 0.19 4.30 -3.89 -7.59
(6.47) (7.63) (9.19) (10.40)
Constant -7.58** -10.61** -15.26** -11.20*
(3.76) (3.98) (6.30) (5.99)
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.56 0.63 0.66
N 412 367 210 191
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. LSDV include sub-category of banks, Dep.
Ratio and banks’ nationality. We decompose each coefficient relative to two
sub-periods: the pre-crisis period from 1999 to 2007 and the post-crisis period from
2008 to 2014. Not all control variables shown. Time Fixed-Effects included.
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Table 7: Leverage determinant and US dollar diversification: introduncing banks’ Fixed Effect
Dependent variable :
Leveraget
(1) (2) (3) (2+3)
Sizet−1 8.08*** 8.40*** 9.21*** 9.79***
(2.29) (2.38) (2.46) (2.51)
Profitt−1 -28.16 -23.89 49.37 81.84
(17.13) (20.25) (101.07) (98.55)
Collateralt−1 7.08 8.12 18.10 20.15
(5.11) (5.69) (12.13) (12.90)
Diverst−1 -10.92* -10.76* -15.86** -14.12*
(5.74) (6.00) (7.10) (7.12)
Collateral x Diverst−1 -14.45 -17.30 -50.24 -59.73
(25.11) (26.65) (36.65) (38.49)
Consot−1 -8.07** -8.11** -5.19** -5.05**
(3.43) (3.41) (2.07) (2.05)
Off BSt−1 -0.93 -0.69 -1.00 -0.61
(2.16) (2.23) (2.31) (2.34)
IFRSt−1 0.57 0.16 1.95 0.66
(2.38) (2.46) (2.35) (2.26)
Constant -48.03** -51.69** -69.71*** -76.08***
(19.10) (20.62) (25.30) (25.68)
Within R2 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.33
N 412 367 209 196
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
Four samples are studied: (1) is the unconstrained sample with all banks ; (2) includes
banks with a minimum of 5 years occurrence over the period ; (3) focuses on
investment banks ; (2+3) is for investment banks with a minimum of 5 years
occurrence. Standard errors are clustered. Time Fixed-Effects included.
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